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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 1

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Volume III

The International Week

While the growing recognitions of Communist China bring closer the issue of Chinese representation in the UN, Trusteeship Council committees have locked horns with the complex issues of Somaliland trusteeship and the internationalization of Jerusalem. Meanwhile in Paris the OEEC countries are analyzing ECA's 1950 grand design for liberalization of intra-European trade and payments and the creation of a European Clearing Union.

China's SC Presidency and the recognition problem. Although the circumstance that the January Security Council presidency falls to Nationalist China is certain to renew vociferous Soviet protests against continued seating of the present Chinese delegation, these objections will probably be made largely for the record. The demand of the Peking government that the UN oust the Nationalist delegation seems to have been put forth with a similar purpose inasmuch as no specific request has yet been made to seat the Communists. It is therefore uncertain whether the USSR will formally contest Tsiang's (China) credentials before enough SC member states have recognized the PRC to assure the success of this move. Inasmuch as only two more recognitions are needed for an SC majority, the Soviet delegation should be willing to wait, particularly if Tsiang calls only a minimum number of routine meetings during the month and avoids any active role in the council.

Meanwhile the UN faces three problems. First, at what point are there enough recognitions of the PRC to warrant the SC's recognition? The British will abstain in the SC until seven members thereof have recognized the Chinese Communists and may propose deferring the seating of a new delegation until a simple majority of UN members have recognized the Peking government. Second, should UN recognition be coordinated between major UN organs such as the SC and the General Assembly, each of which is the judge of its own credentials and where different majority views might prevail? Some members may favor postponing the SC's decision until the GA is in session so that simultaneous action may be taken. Finally, what can be done should the Nationalist delegation use the double veto


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to declare the SC's seating of a PRC delegation a substantive decision and then proceed to veto the same? Tsiang has recommended to his government that the veto be used only if seven SC members (excluding the US) should vote to seat the Communists. The chances are that Nationalist China would abandon the use of the veto once the US had recognized the PRC seeing that the jig was up. In any case, the process of supplying answers to the problems involved in the collapse of the Nationalist government is certain to establish important UN precedents.

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Plans for Somaliland transfer face complications. Although desiring to be relieved of Italian Somaliland at the earliest possible moment, the UK has modified its previous determination to formally transfer Somaliland by the end of March regardless of whether the UN Trusteeship Council and Italy have negotiated a trusteeship agreement. The General Assembly authorized provisional Italian

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administration after negotiation of the agreement, but there is no certainty that this can be accomplished before the above date, after which time the monsoon sets in and Mogadishu harbor becomes unusable.

A six-member TC committee is meeting in Geneva in an attempt to present an agreed draft to the Council's sixth session beginning 19 January. The draft will take advantage of trusteeship experience to date and only a few articles should be controversial. However, a serious complication facing the committee is Ethiopia's refusal to recognize the UN decision. Authorized to participate without vote in the deliberations, Ethiopia is reportedly considering an appeal to the International Court of Justice for an opinion on the competence of Italy, as a non-Member, to negotiate a trusteeship agreement with the UN. Ethiopia's reaction is linked to its claims on Eritrea and its fear of renewed Italian encirclement, aggravated by the unsettled Somaliland boundary.

An expeditious decision on Somaliland may also be affected by TC preoccupation with the thorny question of Jerusalem, highlighting its agenda, and by current tension in Eritrea, though the TC President is anxious to steer the Council as swiftly as possible to a decision. Additional problems may arise in spelling out the precise terms of reference of the unique Somaliland advisory council (Egypt, Colombia, Philippines) and from reactions (Soviet and other) to proposed Italian military installations in the territory. Another important factor will be the attitude of the Somali Youth League and other anti-Italian groups to the return of Italian forces, scheduled to take place in advance of the formal turnover. Local disorders and border disturbances may exacerbate Italo-Ethiopian relations and induce further delay and a cautious attitude on the part of the TC. It thus appears that negotiations will be difficult, and the date for their conclusion problematical, though the Council President hopes to conclude them by late February.

Possible WFTU blow at MDAP shipments. The recent visit of the French WFTU Maritime Workers Secretary to Antwerp to brief the Belgian Communist dockers chief may foreshadow a major WFTU effort to interfere with the unloading of MDAP shipments in European ports. This visit is reported to have involved the scheduling in February of the general maritime strike which the WFTU Maritime Department had originally planned for last fall. While Communist inspired maritime efforts in Western Europe have concentrated on sabotage of ERP in 1948 and subsequently on shipments to the Vietnam war, the February date and the selection of Antwerp suggest that the next blow may be aimed directly at MDAP. Although the WFTU and French

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Communist labor leaders have been working hard to organize trade union "committees in defense of peace," their capability of launching successful political strikes in MDAP ports is doubtful. A shipping tie up of this scope would almost certainly be strongly resisted by local committees or the powerful anti-communist International Transport Workers. Moreover, as indicated by the recent anti-strike vote of the Cherbourg dockers, it might not be generally supported by rank-and-file dockers in the Communist-led maritime unions.

Thai exclusion from Free Trade Union International weakens non-Communist Asian labor. The refusal of the Free Trade Union International to accept representatives from the Thai Labor Union on the grounds that it is not independent of the Government will, if not modified, seriously weaken efforts to unify non-Communist labor in Southeast Asia. This refusal was based upon the supervision which the Thai War Ministry exercises over the labor union. Insistence by the new international on a strict interpretation of independence would result in large defections from and possibly cause the disintegration of the only non-Communist labor organization in Thailand, thus leaving the field open for Communist domination of its 50,000 trade union members. The US Embassy in Bangkok points out that Asiatic workers currently lack the interest and initiative to form independent, "grass roots" unions and that therefore in Thailand and in other Asiatic countries a successful labor union must be either Communist-controlled or government-sponsored. In the circumstances it is probably only by prompt reconsideration of its position that the Free Trade Union Confederation can avoid a major setback in an area where anti-Communist forces badly need its aid. Such reconsideration will be the more likely should the Thai Government take the control of labor away from its War Ministry.

ILO Asian Conference to concentrate on Technical Assistance. The ILO Asian Regional Conference, to be held in Ceylon 16-28 January, will be principally concerned with implementing the UN Technical Assistance Program in the Far East and with other measures designed to increase productivity among workers in the underdeveloped Asian countries. The support which the conference could provide for non-Communist labor in Southeast Asia was recently emphasized by the Secretary of the New Zealand Federation of Labor who hopes that it will serve as a counterweight to the recent WFTU Asian Conference. Continued ILO relations with the Communist-controlled WFTU may also become an issue at the Ceylon Conference.

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The Sovietization of the WFTU, coupled with its mounting drive to penetrate Southeast Asia, has made the red international increasingly objectionable to the non-Communist workers represented in the ILO and they may demand formal ILO repudiation of this connection.

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Talks planned on colonial problems. Disturbed by recent General Assembly action extending the degree of UN supervision over trust and non-self-governing territories, the western powers are moving toward a reassessment of their position vis-a-vis the UN on this issue. UK, French and Belgian colonial experts will meet this month to "discuss common problems," while the State Department has suggested bilateral talks with the three colonial countries during which it will try to reach an understanding on the broad US objective of retaining the friendship of colonial peoples without jeopardizing the positions of the colonial powers. A French Foreign Office official, deprecating recent differences at Lake Success, feels that the Department suggestion is a very "timely and happy initiative" and believes it most important that such differences be ironed out before the next GA. The UK similarly welcomes the US proposal and states that British colonial policy will be re-examined on an inter-departmental level within the next month and that the Cabinet will probably be asked to make a decision.

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